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One advantage of this theory is that it enabled administrative law to be described within a general theory of invalidity. The relevant statute described not only the extent and nature of the powers being conferred, it also specified the consequences of any breach of power. 8 On the face of it a court in performing the function of judicial review was doing no more than enforcing the will of the legislature as expressed in its statutes.
As we shall see, this theory is still well accepted in Australia. However, it has a number of problems. First, the theory of ultra vires does not, in itself, describe the extent or nature of the powers conferred. The theory identifies the source of the jurisdiction-it does not necessarily prescribe the process of statutory interpretation. For example, if one ignores for the moment the possibility of review for an error on the face of the record, 9 in Australia the law is clear that judicial review is only available in relation to jurisdictional errors. 10 In Australia an error of law, at least if committed by a judicial body, does not give rise to a jurisdictional error. The relevant legislation conferring jurisdiction is interpreted as authorising the inferior court to make jurisdictional errors. 11 This is not the position in England, 12 even though, until recently, the English courts also justified judicial review by the principle of ultra vires. 13 There are some commentators who seem to have confused the debate about whether judicial review is or should be limited to jurisdictional errors or not, with the debate about whether the overarching principle is the ultra vires theory or some other theory. 14 The reality is that the issues are separate. The ultra vires theory does not itself dictate whether statutory powers should be interpreted as permitting or proscribing non jurisdictional errors. However, the issue then needs to be faced whether there is some other principle beyond the ultra vires principle that is also in operation to explain not merely the question of jurisdiction, but also the issue of statutory interpretation involved.
Another example can be seen in the development and explanation of the principle articulated by Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation 15 that the exercise of a discretion will be invalid if the result is 'so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the power'. 16 That principle can be traced back to the test of unreasonableness as applied to delegated legislation in
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 8
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhadwaj (2001) Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 372-5, 388-91; R v Wicks [1998] AC 92, 117; Vanmeld Pty Ltd v Fairfield City Council (1999) 46 NSWLR 78, [89] [90] [91] This is discussed below, see text accompanying nn 111-4.
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Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhadwaj (2001) Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135, 145-6, 158; Foster v Minister for Customs & Justice (1999) 164 ALR 357, - [8] .
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Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. 13 See Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143, 171 and see discussion below. 
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Volume 30 ____________________________________________________________________________________ cases such as Kruse v Johnson. 17 Although in England the cases on unreasonableness of delegated legislation have been treated as a separate ground of common law review, 18 in Australia it has been accepted that Wednesbury unreasonableness is a test of ultra vires. 19 It is presumed that it is a condition of the grant of delegated legislative power that the power must be exercised in a manner that is not Wednesbury unreasonable. The Australian approach is consistent with the ultra vires theory although the practical reality is that 'review for so-called Wednesbury unreasonableness … challenges the dividing line between merit and legality'. 20 But, the Australian approach is unable to explain why it is only Wednesbury unreasonableness, rather than simply unreasonableness, that is implied. Given that Parliament is unlikely to have said anything expressly about the issue at all, why have the courts proceeded on the basis that Parliament intended one thing and not the other? Should the statutory implication be Wednesbury unreasonableness, or rationality, 21 or both? What are the limits on any such implications and why do they exist? The ultra vires theory has nothing to say about these questions. Clearly there are other principles being applied by the courts in making relevant choices.
The same analysis can be applied in relation to the rules of procedural fairness. Applying the ultra vires theory, the relevant legislation conferring the relevant power is interpreted as being subject to an implied condition that where the relevant power will interfere with a legitimate expectation the power can only be exercised after the person given the power has afforded 'procedural fairness' to those having a legitimate expectation. 22 But again, why have the courts proceeded on the basis that the parliament intended one thing and not another? Why choose legitimate expectations rather than full blown rights or rather than mere expectations? And, if procedural fairness is statutory, why is it only procedural and not substantive fairness?
Even if administrative law is to be explained in terms of a theory of ultra vires it seems clear that more is involved than merely that theory. Some further theory is needed to explain the actual choices being made. 22 See, eg, the description of the theoretical basis in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 609.
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Common Law Judicial Review 221 ____________________________________________________________________________________ But the ultra vires theory, at least if it is limited to ultra vires of a statute, can be challenged on a more fundamental basis. There are at least three aspects of administrative law-one ancient and the other two relatively recent-that cannot be explained by that theory 23 .
The ancient aspect of administrative law that cannot be explained by ultra vires theory is the availability of certiorari to correct an error of law 24 on the face of the record of an inferior court or of an administrative tribunal. 25 Such an error need not be a jurisdictional error and the availability of certiorari in this circumstance would not appear to be explainable in terms of ultra vires theory.
There are two more recent exceptions. The first is that, starting in 1967 in England, the rules of natural justice have been applied to the exercise of prerogative powers. 26 This development was confirmed by the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 27 and is clearly now the accepted law in England. In England, the question whether a person exercising a power is required to comply with natural justice does not depend upon the source of the power but upon the nature of that power. 28 This same development has subsequently been recognised and followed in Australia. 29 Of course, once judicial review is not founded upon statutory interpretation or upon some traditional limitation upon prerogative powers then it can only be founded upon some autonomous development of the common law.
The second problem arises in relation to the expansion of judicial review to private sector bodies. There are at least two circumstances where judicial review has been extended to such bodies. The first is where the body is authorised by some private arrangement (such as a contract) to undertake 'public powers' or affect 'public rights' such as the right to work. 30 The second is where private persons exercise such rights of 
24
For this purpose an error of law may include errors in findings of 'primary' facts: see Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54, 77; Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, 340-41. 25 See Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, 175-6, 180-83 
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Volume 30 ____________________________________________________________________________________ their own volition, but in circumstances where the decision of that body has practical consequences. Examples include bodies established to administer self-regulatory schemes. 31 It is not obvious that these examples can be explained by any theory of ultra vires. They are not related to any statutory function. Where any explanation has been attempted then the explanation, as with the prerogative, is based upon the power of the judges to intervene. 32 These various exceptions to the ultra vires theory led some to doubt whether administrative law could be explained simply in terms of statutory interpretation and ultra vires. In a seminal article, Dawn Oliver suggested that judicial review was to be explained not on the basis of statutory interpretation, but rather on the basis of a freestanding principle of the common law. 33 The debate has been taken up in other jurisdictions, including Australia 34 though perhaps not with the same vigour that it has been pursued in England.
THE RESPONSE OF THE ENGLISH COURTS
In recent times English judges and academic commentators have identified at least two bases for judicial review.
The first involves describing the principle supporting judicial review of administrative action as being the 'rule of law'. In itself this is probably not very contentious. However, 'the rule of law' can bear any number of meanings. Sometimes the phrase is used as a factual summary of the basic principles of 'constitutionalism'; sometimes as an ideal or aspiration only partly embodied in actual constitutional practice. 35 Where the phrase is used as an 'ideal' or aspiration it may include broad conceptions of justice including the protection of human rights, the fulfilment of legitimate expectations etc.
English commentators have used the phrase the 'rule of law' in a 'rights based' or aspirational sense rather than in a 'rule-based' sense. So, it has been argued, some rights are so essential to the maintenance of the constitutional structure that they must be complied with notwithstanding that those rights might not be described as 'laws'. Such rights would include the right to equality, the right to fairness, the achievement 36 There have also been significant extra-judicial writings on the 'rule of law' in an aspirational sense (including human rights) as a fundamental constitutional norm in the UK. 37 Until very recently it was unclear whether any of this was having any effect upon the House of Lords. For example in December 1998, Lord Steyn described ultra vires as the 'central principle of administrative law'. 38 However, it would seem clear that both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords have now adopted a broader approach based upon a broad view of the rule of law. 39 For example, in R (Mahmood) Upon the question, "What is the correct standard of review in a case such as this?", there are at least in theory [two possible common law approaches]. The first is the conventional Wednesbury position … On this model the court makes no judgment of its own as to the relative weight to be attached to this or that factor taken into account in the decisionmaking process; it is concerned only to see that everything relevant and nothing irrelevant has been considered, and that a rational mind has been brought to bear by the Secretary of State in reaching the decision. The second approach recognises that a fundamental right, here family life, is engaged in the case; and in consequence the court will insist that that fact be respected by the decision-maker, who is accordingly required to demonstrate either that his proposed action does not in truth interfere with the right, or if it does, that there exist considerations which may reasonably be accepted as amounting to a substantial objective justification for the interference.
In that case Laws LJ adopted the second approach. This approach was expressly supported by three Law Lords, including Lord Steyn, in 41 In consequence of this new broad approach the House of Lords has now acknowledged that the principle of proportionality 42 is recognised and applied by the English common law. 43 As John McMillan has commented,
[t]he English jurisprudence is leading increasingly to the position that there are rights … that inhere in the constitutional structure. It is therefore said to be part of the judicial role to identify, articulate and safeguard those values as constitutional or legal rules. Notions of "fairness", "proportionality" and "equality" quickly emerge as legally enforceable conditions on the exercise of executive power. 44 This approach is based upon a broad view of the rule of law and, to that extent, may still be explained by a broad theory of ultra vires. The approach is, however, necessarily inconsistent with any attempt to give any role to legislative intent in relation to the relevant function. It is also inconsistent with separation of powers principles. The new English approach clearly permits merit review subject only to whatever forbearance the judge, as a matter of policy, is prepared to give. But in almost all cases the Parliament has given the task of merit determination to the executive, not to the courts. For the courts to take on that function themselves necessarily involves both ignoring the parliamentary intent and the performance by the judiciary of an executive function.
The New Zealand courts have adopted a similar approach to that of the English courts. 45 The other approach that has had some judicial support in England has not relied upon the rule of law as the basis for judicial review. Instead it has identified a new common law norm that limits the exercise of public power. Whereas the previous theory of judicial review was based upon the source of the power (in particular, a statutory source), now it is argued the theory is based upon the nature of the power (in particular whether it is a power that is appropriate for judicial review?). 46 The justification for the change is that in consequence of it the courts can hold the executive (and, in principle at least, the legislature) accountable to the people by requiring them to act in accordance with certain minimum standards. 47 So considered, the courts in _____________________________________________________________________________________ 41 [2001] Australia are concerned with the appropriateness of the exercise of power, not with the rule of law, at least as usually understood. This approach concentrates upon 'fairness' and upon 'outcomes'. International human rights norms, including the rights conferred by the European Human Rights Convention have played a significant role in the development of this approach. 48 Probably the best example thus far of the application of this approach is the case of R v North and East Devon Health Authority; Ex parte Coughlan. 49 On the ultra vires approach the consequence of a failure to comply with a precondition to the exercise of a power was that the exercise of the power was invalid and of no effect. So, for example, where there was a requirement for a fair hearing, which had not been complied with, the courts would set aside the relevant administrative or judicial act. What the courts did not do was enforce the 'legitimate expectation'. 50 To do that would be to turn the expectation into a substantive private right, rather than to require the decision maker to comply with the law.
Nevertheless 
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Federal Law Review Volume 30 ____________________________________________________________________________________ basis of a breach of the rule of law, but on the basis that the failure of the decision maker to accord with the expectation would involve an 'abuse of power'. 51 It would appear from Lord Woolf's reasons that the overarching principle that he views as supporting administrative law is preventing 'abuses of power'. This approach cannot be explained by any theory based upon ultra vires.
It may be that some of the recent changes in and development of the common law in England may in the future be ascribed instead to the Human Rights Act, 1998 (UK) which may well provide a statutory basis for the further development of judicial review in the United Kingdom. 52 Leaving aside the effect of that Act, these developments in England in identifying the common law principle behind administrative law have been described generally as 'the common law theory'. This description is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, it suggests a degree of uniformity between those supporting a broader approach to judicial review than probably exists in fact. For example, in a recent article Paul Craig and Nicholas Bamforth have argued that the common law theory does not involve any change in the respective role and function of the courts and the Parliament. They suggest that under the common law theory the Parliament remains sovereign, but must spell out its intentions with considerable clarity if it is intending to interfere with the 'rule of law'. 53 With respect, not all who would subscribe to the common law theory would accept that the courts would always defer to the Parliament in all circumstances. 54 On the other hand, not all who subscribe to the 'common law theory' would agree that the courts have the power to question the validity of a statute. The reality is that 'bottom uppers' form a reasonably disparate and motley crew.
The other problem with describing the theory as 'the common law theory' is that it suggests that the ultra vires theory is somehow divorced from the common law. This is perhaps the worst fault of the description, and one to which it will be necessary to return in due course.
THE RESPONSE OF THE HIGH COURT
The High Court of Australia has also grappled with these issues. The history of its involvement has been discussed in a recent article by Susan Kneebone. 55 For present purposes that history can be described reasonably briefly.
In Kioa v West 56 Mason J described natural justice as a 'common law doctrine' 57 that was imposed by the common law upon decision makers. In the same case, Brennan J 
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Common Law Judicial Review 227 ____________________________________________________________________________________ described the requirement to comply with natural justice as an expression of 'the legislature's intention that observance of the principles of natural justice is a condition of the valid exercise of the power'. 58 That debate was continued in later cases. For example, in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin 59 Brennan J noted that the expansion of judicial review had been achieved by 'an increasingly sophisticated exposition of implied limitations on the extent or the exercise of statutory power'. 60 In Quin Brennan J concluded:
The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository's power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone. 61 This statement of principle would seem to confirm that the role of the courts in judicial review is based upon the principles of ultra vires and, further, that that principle precludes merit review. That statement of principle would seem to have majority support by the High Court. 62 It would also seem that a majority of the Court would accept that, at least for statutory powers, the jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action is to be found in the relevant statute. 63 However, this debate does not have the same significance in the High Court as it has in England. In Australia it does not matter so much whether the basis of judicial review is viewed as being a common law concept that is subject to statute, or as being a necessary consequence of statutory interpretation. 64 This is because, at least until very recently, Mason J would not have disagreed with the conclusion by Brennan J in Quin. Mason J's approach to judicial review may have been more flexible than Brennan J's, 65 but it was clearly not intended to permit merit review. 66 (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 331, 332; Kneebone, above n 3, 105-6; Aronson and Dyer, above n 29, 312. However, it is not obvious why this is necessarily true. In each instance it depends upon the content of the implication, rather than its source. It cannot be assumed that the common law will always be more 'liberal' than the Parliament. 66 Mason, above n 65, 331-9.
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Volume 30 ____________________________________________________________________________________ approach, at least until very recent times, 67 was still based upon legality and ultra vires. The difference is that Mason J found the source of ultra vires in the common law, as affected by statute; whereas Brennan J found it in statute affected by the common law. 68 This is to be contrasted with the approach in England. The common law theory, as it has developed there, is not concerned with legality or ultra vires at all. Rather, as explained above, it is concerned with the development and enforcement of new common law constitutional norms.
This brings us back to the problem referred to earlier of using labels in a way that is misleading. If the approach of Brennan J in Quin is described as the 'ultra vires theory' and that of Mason J in Kiao v West as the 'common law theory' this is misleading in that it suggests that the approach of Mason J was not itself based upon a theory of ultra vires, albeit a different one from Brennan J. Even more concerning is that the use of these labels may confuse Mason J's approach in Kiao v West with that of the English judges and commentators who have proceeded in a very different direction.
It is interesting to note that the Canadian courts have also generally adopted the view that judicial review is to be explained on the basis of ultra vires of a statute. However, the Canadian courts have reached a very different view as to the how the relevant statute is to be interpreted. In Canada, the courts have accepted that administrative tribunals are to be afforded a degree of 'deference' 69 that has been rejected by the Australian High Court. 70 Even so, the basis for identifying just how much deference is due is to be discovered from the interpretation of the relevant statute.
As it was put by Iacobucci J for the Court in Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers):
From the outset, it is important to set forth certain principles of judicial review. There exist various standards of review with respect to the myriad of administrative agencies that exist in our country. The central question in ascertaining the standard of review is to _____________________________________________________________________________________ In answering this question, the courts have looked at various factors. Included in the analysis is an examination of the tribunal's role or function. Also crucial is whether or not the agency's decisions are protected by a privative clause. Finally, of fundamental importance, is whether or not the question goes to the jurisdiction of the tribunal involved. 71 The description of the source of the jurisdiction to review the relevant act or decision is the same as that given by Brennan J. It is the statute. The Canadian Supreme Court, like the Australian High Court has accepted that its role in reviewing administrative action is based upon the principle of ultra vires. However, the content of the authority granted by the Canadian legislatures has been very differently interpreted by the Canadian courts.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
As discussed above the English and New Zealand courts have, at least in recent times, accepted a wider basis for judicial review than ultra vires as it is generally understood. This basis is essentially that the common law itself will justify and authorise the courts in developing their own rules to control administrative action which breaches certain minimum standards identified by the common law. The courts in Australia and Canada have not gone so far. They have still identified the basis for judicial review as being the principle of ultra vires, that is, that the relevant administrative act or decision was in breach of or unauthorised by the law, or was beyond the scope of the power given to the decision maker by the law and was consequently of no legal effect, or the relevant decision maker had failed to comply with the law and should be compelled to do so.
The question then arising is whether Australian courts can or should follow the English lead? The answer is that they cannot. The reason lies in the constitutional context in which judicial review occurs in Australia.
With any liberal democratic government the constitutional structure must contain and support both the rule of law and the democratic principle. Usually they are not in conflict. The rule of law sustains the democratic institutions and vice versa. However, that is not always the case. Judicial review is one option 72 for resolving conflict when the democratic will, or those representing it, breach the rule of law.
So understood, the debate about the nature and extent of judicial review is ultimately a constitutional debate. 73 With an unwritten Constitution, such as in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, that constitutional debate has involved a consideration of constitutional principle against the background of the common law. 
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Both the rule of law and the democratic principle are assumptions upon which the Commonwealth Constitution is drafted. The assumptions form at least part of the context for the interpretation of the Constitution. 75 It is clear that the 'rule of law' is a fundamental assumption of the Commonwealth Constitution. 76 The concept of a Constitution as a fundamental source of governmental authority may itself assume the rule of law. 77 In any event covering clause 5 requires governments and subjects to obey the Constitution and laws made under it and specific provisions, particularly ss 75(iii) 78 and (v) 79 can be viewed as manifestations of the principle. Other provisions within Chapter III of the Constitution have also been viewed as being reflective of 'the rule of law', for example, section 80. 80 The principle of separation of judicial power from legislative and executive power, which is contained within the text and structure of the Constitution, is also reflective of the principle. 81 So too is the separate but related 'incompatibility principle' recognised in Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, 560. 82 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (1996) 189 CLR 51 ('Kable'). The 'incompatibility principle' had previously been justified in relation to federal courts on the basis that such a principle was necessary in order to prevent the separation of powers doctrine from being undermined: Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57, 67, 73-4, 81-2; Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 362, 376, 390, 398 . However, since the decision in Kable extended the principle to state parliaments and state courts it is clear that the incompatibility principle can no longer be justified on the basis of separation of powers principles. Rather, the incompatibility principle is now justified on the basis that the text and structure of the Constitution require an 'integrated court system' dealing with an 'integrated system of law'. The incompatibility principle as it applies both to federal and state courts is no longer an aspect of the principle of separation of powers contained within Chapter III, even though it is related to it: Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 95, 103-4, 117. 83 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 95-6, 101-4, 110-16, 139-44 . For example, the requirement of impartiality, which is recognised in the incompatibility principle, reflects the rule of law: Ex parte Miah (2001) 179 ALR 238, 282 n 133; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 176 ALR 644, 667 [103] . ____________________________________________________________________________________ It is one thing for 'the rule of law' to be assumed by the Constitution. It is another to describe its meaning and effect. The 'rule of law' as assumed within the Commonwealth Constitution involves a relatively narrow use of the phrase. 84 The practical operation and effect of 'the rule of law' assumption is that the executive and the people are subject to the law as interpreted and declared by the courts, that federal judicial power should be separate and distinct from legislative and executive power and that judges should be impartial and independent. 85 The 'rule of law' as assumed within the Commonwealth Constitution has two particular elements that are critical to the analysis of the proper role of judicial review. 86 Those elements are primarily derived from the High Court's analysis of the separation of powers principle within the Commonwealth Constitution. The first element is that it is the role of the courts to interpret and apply the law. 87 The second is that the separation of judicial power from legislative and executive power operates to limit the power of the judiciary in relation to the functions to be performed by both the executive and the legislature. 88 The 'democratic principle' is reflected within the Commonwealth Constitution by the express terms of Chapter I of the Constitution and in the implication of that form of representative democracy that can be identified particularly from ss 7 and 24. 89 As Keith Mason has suggested:
By affirming the supremacy of Parliament the (rule of) law thereby concedes the hierarchy of enacted over common law. In doing so it (indirectly) affirms democratic values, to the extent that parliament functions and continues to function in a democratic milieu. 90 The democratic principle, in affirming the primacy, subject only to the Constitution, of the democratic institutions of governments, also necessarily requires a limited role for judicial review. Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 66-8, 112-14. Contrast Patrick Keyzer, 'Pfeiffer, Lange , the Common Law of the Constitution and the Constitutional Right to Natural Justice ' (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 87. 86 This analysis is fundamentally the same as that of Kneebone, above n 3, 99 and of Gageler, above n 1, 309-10. It differs from Susan Kneebone's analysis in that it views the Constitution (rather than a different common law analysis) as being the distinguishing feature between the English and the Australian approach. It differs from Stephen Gageler's in that it does not concentrate on s 75(v) as being the only relevant constitutional provision, and identifies the role of the Constitution in the development of the common law.
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Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135, 152-3; Leslie Zines, 'Federalism and Administrative Discretions in Australia, with European Comparisons' (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 291, 291-8. 88 Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, 579-80; Nicholas v R (1998) 193 CLR 173, 197, 275-6; Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272; Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 35-6; David Bennett, 'Balancing Judicial Review and Merits Review' (2000) 53 Administrative Review 3, 5-6.
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Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557-9. 90 Keith Mason, 'The Rule of Law' in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Law and Government Vol 1 (1995) 114 , 125.
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EFFECT OF THE CONSTITUTION
Notwithstanding the different labels that have been used, sometimes in a misleading fashion, it is clear that the questions of the proper basis for and the extent of judicial review are ultimately questions to be answered by the common law. This is true whether the basis for judicial review is to be found in the common law rules and presumptions relating to the interpretation of statutes, 91 or in a separate common law norm. However, it needs to be understood that in this area of discourse the common law has a symbiotic relationship with the constitutional structure. 92 It both informs our understanding of the Constitution, but itself must conform to that Constitution.
As Kirby J remarked in Pfeiffer v Stevens, 93 '[i] n Australia, the legitimacy and authority of all law must ultimately be traced to, or be consistent with, the federal Constitution.' So, within Australia, the common law must conform to the Constitution. Where there is repugnancy between the common law and the Constitution then, as would be the case with a repugnancy to a statute, the common law is abrogated so as to avoid the repugnancy. 94 However, the Constitution has a broader effect upon the common law than merely to abrogate it in cases of inconsistency. In addition the common law can and should be developed by the courts by reference to constitutional principles even where there is no repugnancy. 95 These effects can be seen in the role of judicial review in Australia. It will be recalled that one of the elements of the rule of law within the Commonwealth Constitution is that it is the role of the courts to finally determine what the law is. This element is strictly limited to the federal courts. A common law principle that was repugnant to that element would be abrogated to that extent. However, there is a single common law in Australia. It can be expected that the single common law will develop in a uniform and consistent fashion having regard to that constitutional element. This explains why judicial deference to the legal interpretation of administrative decision makers was necessarily rejected by the High Court in On the other hand, in Canada, where separation of judicial power is not so rigid (or at least, not yet so rigid) as in Australia and where administrators may exercise judicial power in some circumstances, such extended deference may remain possible. 97 In the United States such deference may be based upon the three way separation of powers which must accommodate a role for the executive branch in at least interpreting the law. 98 Another element of the rule of law under the Commonwealth Constitution restricts federal courts from performing executive functions. Applying the same reasoning it can be expected that this element would be applied in the development of the uniform and single Australian common law. This element explains why the Australian courts cannot adopt a free standing 'common law theory' of the English or New Zealand type to explain judicial review. The Constitution itself limits the role and function of the federal courts. 99 It is not their role or function to carry out the executive function of administration 100 or the legislative function of determining policy. These are the The effect of the Constitution in relation to state courts is more limited than in relation to federal courts: see Kable v Direction of Public Prosecutions (1996) 189 CLR 51. However, the effect upon the common law is the same. This is for two reasons. First, there is a single common law and not (as in the US) separate federal and State common laws. Second, the effect of the constitutional principle is not direct; it merely provides a direction for the development of the common law. The development need not be limited to the constitutional principle so long as it is not repugnant to it. 100 In this context statutory 'appeals' de novo from administrative decisions must be distinguished from judicial review on the basis of merit. Even though there may be little or no difference in substance, the former will usually involve the exercise of judicial power; the latter would involve the exercise of executive power: see Precision Data Holdings v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 189; R v Davison (1954) proper role of the other arms of government. 101 The proper role of the federal courts is to determine if the relevant legislative or executive act or decision was in breach of or unauthorised by the law or was beyond the scope of the power given to the decision maker by the law. In this broad sense, the proper role of the federal courts is to determine if the act or decision was ultra vires and was consequently of no legal effect, or if the relevant decision maker had failed to comply with the law and should be compelled to do so. Applied more generally to the development of the common law, all Australian courts are precluded by the common law from merit review simply because the relevant legislative scheme has clearly conferred the determination of merit to a legislative or executive body.
This second element also explains why Australian courts must retain a distinction between jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors. 102 Notwithstanding the difficulty, indeed often apparent artificiality, of the distinction, 103 it is a distinction between errors that are authorised and errors that are not; between acts that are unauthorised by law and acts that are authorised. Such a distinction is inherent in any analysis based upon separation of powers principles.
This limited role of judicial review is confirmed by the 'the democratic assumption' which affirms the primacy of valid statutes over the common law.
When the role of the Commonwealth Constitution in identifying and limiting the role of the courts in judicial review is understood it is not surprising that countries with a written Constitution, such as Australia and Canada 104 have taken a more limited view
_____________________________________________________________________________________
States ( 105 The vigorous debate that has occurred in England over the last decade as to the proper role and function of judicial review 106 has taken place in a different constitutional context to that in Australia-the consequence is that much if not all of that debate is fundamentally irrelevant to Australian judges and lawyers.
Other questions remain where the constitutional context may have some role. For example the extent to which the Parliament may legislate to limit what errors may be described as jurisdictional errors without transgressing the Constitution may still be a live constitutional issue. 107 There is also some suggestion in some cases that s 75(v) of the Commonwealth Constitution is itself the source of some of the obligations and duties at least upon Commonwealth officers, 108 although it seems clear that even if those rights and obligations are somehow 'constitutionalised' by s 75(v) they are still to be identified from the common law as understood in the context of the Constitution 109 .
On the other hand, the role of the Commonwealth Constitution should not be overstated. It provides the ultimate justification for judicial review and sets its parameters, but does not explain the detail of its operation. True it is that the constitutional context means that parliamentary intent as expressed in a statute has primacy over the common law; true it is that the constitutional context means that the courts cannot engage in merit review and are required to differentiate between 'jurisdictional errors' and 'non jurisdictional errors'. But within these parameters there is still considerable room for debate for example as to whether a particular error should be considered a jurisdictional error or not. 110 
